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Abstract
Consider an odd-sized jury, which determines a majority verdict
between two equiprobable states of Nature. If each juror indepen-
dently receives a binary signal identifying the correct state with iden-
tical probability p, then the probability of a correct verdict tends to
one as the jury size tends to infinity (Condorcet, 1785). Recently,
Alpern and Chen (2017a,b) developed a model where jurors sequen-
tially receive signals from an interval according to a distribution, which
depends on the state of Nature and on the juror’s “ability”, and vote
sequentially. This paper shows that to mimic Condorcet’s binary sig-
nal, such a distribution must satisfy a functional equation related to
tail-balance, that is, to the ratio α(t) of the probability that a mean-
zero random variable satisfies X > t given that |X | > t. In particular,
we show that under natural symmetry assumptions the tail-balances
α(t) uniquely determine the distribution.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a functional equation arising from an extension of the
celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem. In Condorcet’s model, an odd-sized
jury must decide whether Nature is in one of two equiprobable states of
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Nature, A or B. Each juror receives an independent binary signal (for A or
for B) which is correct with the same probability p > 1/2. Condorcet (1785)
[or see Todhunter (2016, Ch. XVII) for a textbook discussion] showed that
when jurors vote simultaneously according to their signal, the probability
of a correct verdict tends to 1 as the number of jurors tends to infinity.
Recently, Alpern and Chen (2017a,b) considered a related sequential voting
model, where jurors receive signals S in the interval [−1,+1] rather than
binary signals. Low signals indicate B and high signals indicate A. The
strength of this “indication” depends on the “ability” of the juror, a number
a between 0 and 1, which is a proxy for Condorcet’s p that tends from 1/2
to 1. When deciding how to vote, each juror notes the previous voting, the
abilities of the previous jurors, his own signal S and his own ability. This is
sufficient to determine which alternative he views as being more likely. The
mechanism that underlies this determination is the common knowledge of
the distributions by which a signal is given as private information to each
juror, depending on his ability and the state of Nature. It is not relevant to
the discussions of this paper, but we mention that one of the main results of
Alpern and Chen is that, given three jurors of fixed abilities, their majority
verdict is most likely to be correct when they vote in the following order:
middle-ability juror first, highest-ability juror next, and finally the lowest-
ability juror.
The cumulative distribution formula of signals S on [−1,+1] that a juror
of ability a receives in the Alpern-Chen jury model is given by
Fa(t) := Pa[S ≤ t |A] = (t+ 1)(at − a+ 2)/4, if Nature is A; (1)
Ga(t) := Pa[S ≤ t |B] = (t+ 1)(a − at+ 2)/4, if Nature is B. (2)
These were selected as the simplest family of distributions arising from linear
densities in which steepness indicates ability: for the signal distributions
following A or B, a high signal in [−1,+1] was to indicate A as more likely,
and a low signal to indicate B as more likely. For this reason an increasing
density function was selected to follow A and a decreasing one to follow B.
The simplest increasing and decreasing densities on [−1,+1] are the linear
functions (taken to mean “affine”) that go through (0, 1/2). This gave the
signal distribution of Alpern-Chen model. It emerges from results below
that these are uniquely determined from requiring the tail-balance to be
linear.
The relation between the two distributions is based on the following
assumption of signal symmetry:
Pa[S ≤ t |A] = Pa[−S ≤ t |B].
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For a continuous distribution it follows that
Ga(t) = Pa[S ≤ t |B] = Pa[−S ≥ −t |B] = 1− Pa[−S ≤ −t |B]
= 1− Pa[S ≤ −t |A] = 1− Fa(−t),
and so
Ga(t) = 1− Fa(−t).
This confirms that, for a juror of any ability a, the probability of receiving
a signal less than t when Nature is B is the same as receiving a signal larger
than t when Nature is A.
The jurors use their private information (signal) S in [0, 1] to calculate
the conditional probabilities of A andB by considering the relative likelihood
that their signal came from the distribution F or the distribution G.
We now wish to relate this continuous signal model to the binary model
of Condorcet. We want our notion of ability a to be a proxy for Condorcet’s
probability p. Since his p runs from p0 = 1/2 (a useless signal) to p1 = 1 (a
certain signal) and our ability a runs from 0 (no ability, useless signals) to 1
(highest ability), for fixed t the conditional probability is a linear transfor-
mation, and so for some coefficient b = b(t) we wish to have
Pa[A |S ≥ t] =
1
2
+ b(t) a,
as the left-hand side is his p if his signals are restricted to −1 (for B) and
+1 (for A), taking any t in (0, 1). We want this conditional probability to
be 1 when t = +1 (highest signal) and a = 1 (highest ability), so this gives
b(1) = 1/2. When t = −1 the condition S ≥ t gives no new information
for any a, so the left-hand side should be the a priori probability of A,
Pa[A], which is 1/2. Hence b(−1) = 0 and, taking b to be linear, we get
b(t) = (t+ 1)/4, or
Pa[A |S ≥ t] =
1
2
+
t+ 1
4
a.
Putting Ha(t) := Pa[S ≤ t |A], so that Pa[S ≤ t |B] = 1−Ha(−t) as above,
by Bayes Law and since P[B] = P[A], we have
Pa[A |S ≥ t] =
Pa[S ≥ t |A]P[A]
Pa[S ≥ t |A]P[A] + Pa[S ≥ t |B]P[B]
=
1−Ha(t)
(1−Ha(t)) + (1− (1−Ha(−t)))
=
1−Ha(t)
1−Ha(t) +Ha(−t)
.
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The last term, comparing the right tail against the tail sum, is known
as the tail-balance ratio (Bingham, Goldie and Teugels, 1989, §8.3). Its
asymptotic behaviour and the regular variation of the tail-sum are particu-
larly relevant to the Domains of Attraction Theorem of probability theory
(Bingham, Goldie and Teugels, 1989, Theorem 8.3.1). The theorem is con-
cerned with stable laws (stable under addition: the sum of two independent
random variables with that law has, to within scale and centering, the same
law), and identifies those that arise as limits in distribution of appropriately
scaled and centered random walks.
In summary we seek a family, indexed by the ability a, of signal dis-
tributions Ha (t) on [−1,+1], which correspond to state of Nature A while
1−Ha (−t) correspond to state of Nature B, such that by Bayes Law
Pa[A |S ≥ t] =
1−Ha(t)
1−Ha (t) +Ha(−t)
=
1
2
+
t+ 1
4
a.
The main technical result of the paper is the following.
Lemma 1. The unique solution for the c.d.f. Ha(t) on [−1,+1] to the fol-
lowing functional equations for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1:
1−Ha(t)
1−Ha(t) +Ha(−t)
=
1
2
+
t+ 1
4
a, −1 ≤ t ≤ +1
is given by
Ha (t) = Fa(t) = (t+ 1)(at− a+ 2)/4.
The standard text-book treatment of functional equations is Acze´l and Dhombres
(1989), but it is often the case that particular functional equations arising
in applications require individual treatment — recent such examples are
El-Hady et al. (2016) and Kahlig and Matkowski (2014); for applications in
probability, see Ostaszewski (2017).
We will prove this result in Section 2, which thus gives the following
consequence for the signal distribution in the jury problem.
Theorem 2. The only c.d.f. on the signal space [−1,+1] that makes the
conditional probability Pa[A |S ≥ t] a linear function of the juror’s ability a
with a slope linear in t are the Alpern-Chen functions Fa(t) and Ga(t) given
in (1) and (2).
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2 Tail-balance equation and proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 in this section is deduced from a more general result
concerning a functional equation of the following type:
1−H(t)
1−H(t) +H(−t)
= α(t), t ∈ [−1,+1), (3)
with α(t) a strictly monotone function, interpreting the left-hand side to be
1 for t = 1. Of interest here are non-negative increasing functions H with
H(−1) = 0 and H(1) = 1 representing probability distribution functions,
hence the adoption of the name “tail balance” (as above). Indeed, with
these boundary conditions,
α(−1) =
1
2
,
implying that the left and right tails of H are exactly balanced; furthermore,
1
2
< α(t) < 1, t ∈ (−1,+1),
since
1−H(t)
1−H(t) +H(−t)
= 1−
H(−t)
1−H(t) +H(−t)
.
Note that H(0) = 1− α(0). The linear case of the last section is thus
α(t) =
1
2
+
t+ 1
4
a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Turning to a general increasing α, we may write
β(t) :=
α(t)
1− α(t)
, t ∈ [−1,+1).
This is again an increasing function with β(t) > 1 for t ∈ (−1,+1) and
limt↑1 β(t) = +∞ if α(1) = 1. Thus in the formula below β(t)β(−t)− 1 > 0
and limt↑1(β(t)− 1)/(β(t)β(−t) − 1) = 1, since β(−1) = 1.
Theorem 3. The tail-balance functional equation (3) has the following
unique non-negative solution:
H(t) =
β(t)− 1
β(t)β(−t) − 1
=
(2α(t) − 1)(1 − α(−t))
α(t) + α(−t)− 1
< 1. (4)
In particular, for α linear as in Lemma 1, we have
H(t) =
(t+ 1)(at− a+ 2)
4
. (5)
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Proof. After some re-arrangement of (3) we have
H(−t) =
1−H(t)
β(t)
.
So
β(−t)H(t) = 1−H(−t) = 1−
1−H(t)
β(t)
.
Hence
(β(t)β(−t) − 1)H(t) = β(t)− 1,
yielding the asserted formula. As for the inequality, we note the equivalence:
β(t)− 1
β(t)β(−t) − 1
< 1⇐⇒ β(t) < β(t)β(−t).
The calculation of the linear case of α is straightforward, and relies on
α(t) + α(−t)− 1 = a/2, and 1− α(−t) = (at− a+ 2)/4.
Our theorem follows. 
Remark 1. More generally, with α(t) monotone as before and Pa[A] = θ
with 0 < θ < 1, so that Pa[B] = 1− θ, writing the odds (1− θ)/θ as λ, the
earlier application of Bayes Rule gives for t ∈ [−1,+1]
Pa[A |S ≥ t] =
1−Ha (t)
1−Ha (t) + λHa (−t)
= α(t). (6)
Here, as 1 + λ = 1 + (1− θ)/θ = 1/θ,
α(−1) =
1
1 + λ
= θ = Pa[A] = Pa[A |S ≥ −1].
To solve (6) we apply a similar procedure as in Theorem 3 by first show-
ing the following variant.
Theorem 4. The equation for t ∈ [−1,+1]
H(−t) = γ(t) + δ(t)H(t) (7)
has solution
H(t) =
γ(t)δ(−t) + γ(−t)
1− δ(t)δ(−t)
, (8)
provided δ(t)δ(−t) 6= 1.
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Proof. Equation (7) may be solved by writing
H(t) = γ(−t) + δ(−t)H(−t)
= γ(−t) + δ(−t)(γ(t) + δ(t)H(t)),
H(t)(1 − δ(t)δ(−t)) = γ(t)δ(−t) + γ(−t),
yielding the claim. 
Corollary 5. Equation (6) has solution for t ∈ [−1,+1]
H(t) =
((λ+ 1)α(t) − 1)(1 − α(−t))
α(t) + α(−t) + (λ2 − 1)α(t)α(−t) − 1
.
Proof. Equation (6) may be rewritten as
(1− α(t)) = (1− α(t))H(t) + λα(t)H(−t), t ∈ [−1,+1],
so is of the more general form above with
γ(t) =
1− α(t)
λα(t)
, δ(t) = −γ(t). (9)
For γ(t) = −δ(t) equation (8) becomes
H(t) =
−γ(t)γ(−t) + γ(−t)
1− γ(t)γ(−t)
=
γ(−t)(1− γ(t))
1− γ(t)γ(−t)
. (10)
Substitution in (10) for γ(t) from (9) gives
H(t) =
1− α(−t)
λα(−t)
1− 1−α(t)
λα(t)
1− 1−α(t)
λα(t)
1−α(−t)
λα(−t)
=
1− α(−t)
α(−t)
·
λα(t)α(−t) − (1− α(t))α(−t)
(λ2α(t)α(−t)) − (1− α(t))(1 − α(−t))
=
((λ+ 1)α(t) − 1((1 − α(−t))
(λ2α(t)α(−t)) − (1− α(t))(1 − α(−t))
=
((λ+ 1)α(t) − 1)(1 − α(−t))
α(t) + α(−t) + (λ2 − 1)α(t)α(−t) − 1
.
Note that, as α is increasing, α(t) > θ for t ∈ (−1,+1] and then (1 −
α(t))/α(t) < (1 − θ)/θ = λ. So, for t ∈ [−1,+1], the denominator in (4) is
non-zero, as
1− α(t)
α(t)
·
1− α(−t)
α(−t)
< λ2.

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Remark 2. When λ = 1 the above corollary yields (4) of Theorem 3.
Theorem 6. The linear case of the general odds tail-balance equation (6),
i.e., with
α(t) = θ + (t+ 1)(1 − θ)a/2,
has solution
H(t) =
(1 + t)(at− a+ 2)a/4
−a2/4 + a2t2/4 + (a+ λa2/4− λa2t2/4)
(11)
=


(1 + t)(at− a+ 2)/(4 − a+ at2), as λ→ 0,
(1 + t)(at− a+ 2)a/4, if λ = 1,
(at− a+ 2)/(λa(1 − t)) = 2/(λa(1 − t))− 1/λ, as λ→∞.
Proof. In the general state of Nature case (6), specializing to the linear
case and repeating the argument in Section 1 does indeed give
α(t) = θ + (t+ 1)(1 − θ)a/2,
as then α(−1) = θ and, for a = 1, α(1) = θ + (1− θ) = 1. Noting that
1− α(−t) = 1− θ −
1
2
(1− t)(1− θ)a =
1
2
(1− θ)(at− a+ 2)
and
α(t) + α(−t)− 1 = 2θ + (1− θ)a− 1 = θ + (1− θ)(a− 1),
and, writing α(t) = B +At for convenience, from Corollary 5 we derive
H(t) =
((λ+ 1)(B +At)− 1)(1 − θ)(at− a+ 2)/2
θ + (1− θ)(a− 1) + (λ2 − 1)(B2 −A2t2)
=
((B +At)/θ − 1)λ(at − a+ 2)/2
1 + λ(a− 1) + (λ2 − 1)(B2 −A2t2)/θ
=
λ2(1 + t)(at− a+ 2)a/4
1 + λ(a− 1) + (λ− 1)(B2 −A2t2)/θ2
,
as 1 + λ = 1/θ (as above), B/θ = 1 + λa/2 and A/θ = λa/2.
Finally, writing µ = 1/λ, we obtain
H(t) =
(1 + t)(at− a+ 2)a/4
µ2 + µ(a− 1) + (1/µ − 1)((µ + a/2)2 − a2t2/4)
,
and here the denominator is
D(t) := −a2/4 + a2t2/4 + (a+ λa2/4− λa2t2/4),
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so that D(t) ∼ λa2(1− t2)/4 as λ→∞ and
lim
λ→0
D(t;µ) = lim
λ→0
(4a− a2 + a2t2)/4.

Remark 3. When λ = 1 we retrieve from (11) the formula (1+t)(at−a+2)/4
as in (5).
3 An alternative proof of Lemma 1
In this section we give, as an alternative to Theorem 3, a direct proof of
Lemma 1, as it is of independent interest.
Consider the following equation:
1−Ha(t)
1−Ha(t) +Ha(−t)
=
2 + (1 + t)a
4
. (12)
We are to show that Ha(t) = (1 + t)(2 + at− a)/4. Introduce two functions
as follows:
fa(t) := Ha(t)−Ha(−t),
ga(t) := Ha(t) +Ha(−t).
Then (12) can be re-written as
Ha(t) = 1−
2 + (1 + t)a
4
(1− fa(t)) . (13)
Similarly, replacing t by −t in (12) leads to
Ha(−t) = 1−
2 + (1− t)a
4
(1 + fa(t)) . (14)
Subtraction of (14) from (13) gives
fa(t) =
2 + (1− t)a
4
(1 + fa(t))−
2 + (1 + t)a
4
(1− fa(t)) =
2 + a
2
fa(t)−
a
2
t,
that is fa(t) = t. On the other hand, summation of (13) and (14) leads to
ga(t) =
at
2
fa(t) +
2− a
2
=
2− a+ at2
2
.
Therefore, we obtain
Ha(t) =
fa(t) + ga(t)
2
=
(1 + t)(2 + at− a)
4
,
as desired. 
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